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Copyright: LG Köln strengthens protection against video uploads

Copyright: LG Köln (Cologne Regional Court) strengthens protection against video uploads

Published on November 20, 2026

In its order of 15 September 2026 (Az. (case no.) 14 O 230/26), the Landgericht Köln (Cologne Regional Court) had to consider whether the use of third-party video clips on several social media platforms was permissible under copyright law. The decision is an interim ruling in preliminary injunction proceedings and not a final judgment on the merits.

Use of a video excerpt

The case centred on the unauthorised use of a video excerpt by a user who published it on three social media platforms as a reel, short-form video and short. The excerpt comprised minutes 4:22 to 4:34 of a video stream produced by the applicant, amounting to 12 seconds. The applicant had not consented to the use of his footage.

The respondent had added text on a red background and a clown emoji to the excerpt. No proper attribution was provided. He had already acknowledged this in his pre-litigation letter of 1 September 2026.

By way of justification, he relied, among other things, on the right of quotation under § 51 UrhG (German Copyright Act), reporting on current events under § 50 UrhG and the privilege for minor uses under the Urheberrechts-Diensteanbieter-Gesetz (UrhDaG, German Copyright Service Provider Act).

Cease-and-desist letter and preliminary injunction

The applicant became aware of the use on 22 August 2026. He sent the respondent a cease-and-desist letter on 31 August 2026, although the letter only addressed the use on one of the three platforms. His application for a preliminary injunction, which covered all three platforms, was received by the court on 4 September 2026.

In particular, the court had to decide whether the user could rely on the privilege for minor uses under §§ 10, 12(3) UrhDaG.

Decision of the LG Köln

The Landgericht granted the application and prohibited the respondent, subject to an administrative fine of up to EUR 250,000 or, alternatively, administrative detention for up to six months, from reproducing or making the excerpt at issue available to the public in the specific form challenged. The respondent must bear the costs of the proceedings, and the amount in dispute is EUR 15,000. In the court’s view, the applicant had substantiated both his entitlement to injunctive relief and the grounds for granting a preliminary injunction.

The sequences of images used constitute, at a minimum, moving images within the meaning of § 95 UrhG. It was undisputed that the applicant had produced the footage and therefore had standing to bring the claim. The claim arises from §§ 97(1), 16, 19a, 94 and 95 UrhG.

By uploading the footage to the platforms, the respondent had made it available to the public, which necessarily also involved reproduction for technical reasons. He had not obtained the required consent. In the court’s view, the use could not be justified under any copyright exception or limitation.

No justification under the right of quotation

The decisive factor initially was the absence of attribution as required by § 63(2) UrhG. According to the Chamber’s settled case law, a breach of the attribution requirement renders the use of the work unlawful in its entirety. The respondent could therefore rely on neither § 51 UrhG nor § 50 UrhG. The Chamber did not share his contrary view.

Irrespective of this, the Chamber was inclined to find that the use did not constitute a quotation within the meaning of § 51 UrhG in the first place. A permissible quotation requires an intrinsic connection between the work used and the quoting party’s own ideas. The third-party work must serve as evidence or as a basis for discussion in support of the quoting party’s own independent commentary. In this case, the added text merely described the events shown in the video. It did not engage with the video or its content.

No privilege under the UrhDaG

The court’s comments on §§ 10 and 12(3) UrhDaG are particularly relevant.

Under § 10 UrhDaG, certain uses are deemed minor and are therefore presumed to be permitted under § 9(2) UrhDaG. These include the use of up to 15 seconds of a cinematographic work or moving images, provided that the use does not serve commercial purposes or generates only negligible revenue. Under § 12(3) UrhDaG, the user is not liable for such uses until the conclusion of a complaints procedure under § 14 UrhDaG.

The court did not allow the respondent to rely on this provision. It first held that a user who infringes the right of communication to the public by uploading content is liable as a direct infringer because the user controls the infringing act.

With regard to the wording of § 12(3) UrhDaG, the Chamber acknowledged that, under that provision, a user is not liable even in the event of copyright infringement until the conclusion of a complaints procedure. Some legal commentators even take the view that, where no complaint is filed, the user may rely on the privilege for the entire period during which the content is communicated to the public.

However, the Chamber classified the provision, in substance, as a copyright limitation benefiting platform users. In the court’s view, such a limitation of the right of communication to the public under Article 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC is permissible only under Article 5 of that Directive. Article 17 of the DSM Directive does not provide for such a limitation. To the extent that the provisions extend the user’s liability privilege beyond this, they are contrary to EU law.

According to the Chamber, §§ 9 to 11 UrhDaG must therefore be interpreted in conformity with the Directive. As a general rule, they apply only in connection with the platform operator’s liability or, at most, establish a rebuttable presumption in favour of the user. In any event, uploads that are manifestly infringing are not covered. Such an infringement had occurred here because the respondent had communicated the excerpts to the public without the applicant’s consent.

No minor use due to commercial interests

Irrespective of this, the Landgericht also found that the requirements for minor use under § 10 UrhDaG had not been met. Although the 15-second time limit had been complied with because the excerpt was 12 seconds long, the requirement that the use must not serve commercial purposes or must generate only negligible revenue was not satisfied.

For the purposes of interpretation, the court referred to recital 69 of the DSM Directive. According to that recital, the individual user’s overall usage behaviour must be assessed. The respondent had more than 200,000 followers across the three channels concerned and also used them to promote his own book. In the Chamber’s view, it therefore had to be assumed that he intended to generate profits. Moreover, according to his affidavit, he actually generated revenue through his channels, including approximately EUR 50 from the video at issue alone.

As the respondent relied on a privilege constituting an exception, he bore the burden of pleading and proof that the use did not serve commercial purposes or generated only negligible revenue. He failed to discharge that burden.

No pending complaints procedure

Furthermore, in the court’s view, there was no pending complaints procedure under § 14 UrhDaG. Contrary to the position taken by some legal commentators, the Chamber requires such a procedure to be actually pending. This follows from the duty to interpret national law in conformity with EU law, since Article 17 of the DSM Directive principally governs the platform operator’s liability, and the user’s privilege is linked to the operator’s conduct.

If no claim has been brought against the platform operator and there is therefore no complaints procedure, the user remains liable as the direct infringer. Otherwise, the rights holder would first have to contact the platform operator through an anonymous procedure and tolerate the infringement in the meantime, even though the rights holder could bring a claim directly against the actual infringer. The Chamber considered this incompatible with the principles of copyright law and EU law.

Risk of recurrence and grounds for a preliminary injunction

The copyright infringement that had already occurred gave rise to a presumption of a risk of recurrence. In principle, this presumption could only have been rebutted by issuing an adequately worded cease-and-desist undertaking subject to a contractual penalty. The respondent did not issue such an undertaking, either in response to the cease-and-desist letter of 31 August 2026 or subsequently.

In copyright law, urgency is not presumed by analogous application of § 12(1) UWG (German Act Against Unfair Competition), nor does it arise solely from the risk of recurrence. The decisive factor is a case-specific balancing of interests. The court found urgency for two reasons:

  • The infringement had not ended. The respondent continued to use the excerpt on at least one platform, and renewed use on the other platforms was to be expected. It was also undisputed that the video had since become available through his YouTube channel. The fact that he may subsequently have added an attribution on one platform did not alter this conclusion, as the use lacked a quotation purpose in the first place.

  • The applicant acted promptly. After becoming aware of the use on 22 August 2026, he responded without delay, and his application was received by the court on 4 September 2026. In view of this urgency, it was immaterial that the cease-and-desist letter addressed only one platform.

Hearing and costs. The respondent was heard before the preliminary injunction was issued, including in view of the principle of equality of arms, because the cease-and-desist letter had not covered all platforms. The court took his submissions into account. The decision on costs is based on § 91(1) ZPO (German Code of Civil Procedure), as the applicant was entirely successful. Preferential treatment regarding costs under § 93 ZPO was unavailable because the respondent had not immediately acknowledged the claim.

Conclusion

The order of the LG Köln dated 15 September 2026 (Az. 14 O 230/26) demonstrates that users of social media platforms cannot readily rely on the privileges under the UrhDaG if they upload third-party video footage without the rights holders’ consent.

Of particular significance is the Chamber’s view that §§ 10 and 12(3) UrhDaG do not provide a privilege for copyright infringements committed by a user as a direct infringer. The Chamber based this conclusion on the incompatibility of such a user limitation with EU law, thereby departing from the wording of § 12(3) UrhDaG and the views expressed by some legal commentators. It remains to be seen whether other courts will follow this approach.

Whether a use is minor must not be assessed solely on the basis of the length of the video used. Although the 15-second limit was met because the excerpt was 12 seconds long, the channel’s reach, the intention to generate profits and the revenue actually generated were also relevant. The user bears the burden of pleading these matters.

For rights holders, the decision means that, where the relevant requirements are met, they may take direct action against the uploading user without first having to conduct a complaints procedure involving the platform operator. For operators and users of high-reach channels, the order underscores the importance of carefully reviewing third-party content. Merely adding text or an emoji to a third-party video does not make its use a permissible quotation.

Note: This is an order issued in preliminary injunction proceedings and not a final judgment on the merits.

MTR Legal Rechtsanwälte advises on copyright law and other areas of industrial property and IP law. Further information is available at copyright law advice.

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