Definition and fundamentals of the three-class franchise
The three-class franchise is a historical electoral system that was mainly used in the German state, especially in the Kingdom of Prussia as well as in some municipalities. It is an electoral system in which the active voting rights of the population are divided into classes. Membership in a class was usually determined by the amount of direct taxes paid. This method of weighting votes resulted in considerable inequality among eligible voters and had far-reaching consequences for the composition of parliament and the distribution of political power.
Historical development
Origins and legal foundation
The three-class franchise was first legally established with the Prussian Electoral Law of May 30, 1849. Its constitutive format was shaped by the Prussian Electoral Law for the election of the Prussian House of Representatives dated May 30, 1849, which was further modified by the law of May 30, 1850. The aim was to secure the political influence of wealthy taxpayers and to restrict the influence of the broader population.
Implementation in Prussia
In the Kingdom of Prussia, the three-class franchise served to elect members for the Prussian House of Representatives. The electors were chosen by taxpaying citizens in so-called class assemblies and subsequently appointed to parliament through an indirect process. This electoral system remained decisive in Prussia until its abolition during the November Revolution of 1918.
Systematics of the three-class franchise
Classification of voters into classes
Eligible voters were divided into three classes based on the amount of direct taxes they paid:
- First class: The citizens who paid the highest taxes, bearing one third of the tax burden.
- Second class: The next highest taxpayers, who paid the second third of taxes.
- Third class: All other voters, who together paid the final third of tax payments.
Irrespective of the number of members, each class provided the same number of electors for the respective municipality or city.
Election process and weight of votes
The electoral system was based on a two-stage, indirect process:
- Classification at municipal level: The municipalities divided eligible voters into the three tax classes. The number of electors was set per class, with each class holding the same number of votes.
- Election of electors and representatives: The electors of each class then chose, in a further assembly, the final representatives for the House of Representatives from among themselves.
This process meant that a small number of taxpayers in the first third often carried the same political weight as the vast majority in the lowest class, leading in extreme cases to a 17- to 20-fold greater voting power for the first class.
Legal evaluation
Constitutional aspects
The three-class franchise stood in clear contradiction to the democratic principle of electoral equality (“one man, one vote”). Although it complied with the requirements of the Prussian Constitution of 1850, it became the subject of sharp criticism after the founding of the Reich in 1871. Under modern constitutions, in particular the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, the three-class franchise would be inadmissible due to the equal and free electoral rights demanded in Art. 38 para. 1 GG.
Discrimination and social implications
The electoral system deliberately privileged wealthy citizens and disadvantaged poorer segments of the population. As a result, the political participation of large parts of the population was severely restricted, which from today’s perspective is regarded as a violation of the general prohibition of discrimination and fundamental democratic principles.
Characteristics and points of criticism
Effects on the political landscape
The three-class franchise cemented a conservative-liberal majority in parliament for decades and contributed to delaying or preventing social reforms and broader political participation. Opposition groups, particularly Social Democrats and representatives of the labor movement, were persistently underrepresented.
Comparison with other electoral systems
The three-class franchise is among the most unequal electoral systems in political history. While the census franchise merely sets a certain tax threshold as a requirement for suffrage, the three-class franchise divides voters into groups and structurally weights their votes differently.
Significance and aftermath
Abolition and outlook
The three-class franchise was abolished in Prussia in November 1918 as part of the revolution and the introduction of equal suffrage. Its rigid structure and ensuing social tensions played a key role in changing electoral law in Germany. Today, the significance of the three-class franchise lies chiefly in its historical context within the development of democratic principles and the political emancipation of all citizens.
Reception in legal literature
In the relevant literature, the three-class franchise is considered a prime example of a deeply unequal electoral system. Experiences with this system have contributed significantly to the legal safeguarding of electoral equality in Germany and Europe.
Summary
The three-class franchise was an electoral system in which eligible voters were divided into three classes according to tax revenues, with each class sending an equal number of electors. As a result, wealthy citizens were distinctly favored politically. The three-class franchise is regarded as a classic example of the disregard for the principle of equality in electoral law and had a decisive influence on debates about democratic reforms. Its abolition paved the way for universal, equal and free suffrage, which is now considered an indispensable part of democratic systems.
Frequently asked questions
What constitutional problems were associated with the three-class franchise?
The three-class franchise was in considerable tension with central principles of constitutional law, particularly the principle of equality. Under the Prussian electoral system, eligible voters were divided into three classes based on their tax revenues, with each class providing one third of the electors. This meant that wealthy citizens, despite being a numerical minority, had far greater influence on election results than citizens with lower incomes. This contradicted the principle of electoral equality (“one person, one vote”) and could be seen as a violation of political equality and democratic principles. Furthermore, the general, equal, and secret ballot—later enshrined in the Weimar Constitution—was undermined by the three-class franchise, which eventually led to broad criticism and disputes over its compatibility with modern constitutional values.
Were there any judicial reviews or rulings against the three-class franchise?
During the time when the three-class franchise was in force in the Kingdom of Prussia (1849-1918), judicial review as understood today—such as by a constitutional court—did not exist. Courts at the time were largely bound by the monarchical constitution and executive decisions; an institution like the Federal Constitutional Court did not exist. Nevertheless, there were parliamentary and political initiatives as well as specialist legal debates that critically examined the electoral law. It was only after the end of the monarchy and with the introduction of the Weimar Constitution that the multi-class franchise was recognized as constitutionally problematic and abolished.
In what way did the three-class franchise violate fundamental rights?
The three-class franchise can primarily be seen as a violation of the principle of electoral equality, which was later explicitly enshrined in German basic laws and constitutions. While fundamental rights did not exist in the modern sense during the time of the three-class franchise in Prussia, retrospectively, from a legal perspective, there are clear fundamental rights concerns—especially since the system disadvantaged certain groups due to their economic weakness as formally equal citizens and in fact excluded them from political participation. The constitutional reform efforts after 1918 addressed these issues and established universal, equal, and direct suffrage as an inalienable fundamental right.
How did the three-class franchise affect legislation and administration from a legal perspective?
Legally, the three-class franchise meant that the legislature and executive in Prussia were primarily shaped by the interests of the economically strongest social classes. Representative bodies did not reflect the population as a whole, but favored classes. This structural distortion influenced the development and application of laws, as well as the selection of civil servants and government members. In academic discourse, this was criticized as a democratic deficit and as weakening the legitimacy of state action.
Was the three-class franchise compatible with international legal principles?
From the perspective of modern international legal standards—for example, Article 21 Section 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—the three-class franchise would have been clearly incompatible. These regulations require equal opportunity in access to public office and universal, equal, and secret suffrage for citizens. However, such norms did not exist at the time the three-class franchise was in effect. Nevertheless, the system was already subject to international criticism and later served as a negative example in debates about democratic electoral reforms in Europe.
Was the end of the three-class franchise regulated constitutionally?
The three-class franchise was abolished during the November Revolution of 1918, explicitly prohibited by the Weimar Constitution of 1919, and replaced with universal, equal, secret, and direct suffrage. Article 22 of the Weimar Constitution provided, for the first time, a constitutionally binding guarantee of democratic electoral principles. In retrospect, the three-class franchise was thus replaced by the new constitutional order, which made the equality of all voters its legal foundation and thereby retrospectively defined the prior system as unconstitutional.
