# EU Sanctions: Family Ties Alone Are Not Enough

> The ECJ clarifies: EU sanctions against relatives require shared interests that objectively go beyond family ties.

Source: https://www.mtrlegal.com/en/eu-sanctions-family-ties-alone-are-not-enough/ · Language: en · Updated: 2026-10-29

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The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has clarified the conditions governing restrictive measures against a natural person who is related to a person already subject to sanctions ([ECJ, judgment of 15 October 2026](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/./legal-content/AUTO/?uri=CELEX:62023CJ0695) – C‑695/23 P). According to the Court, a family relationship alone is not sufficient. Shared interests are required that objectively go beyond the community of interests typically associated with such a relationship. In the case at hand, the ECJ dismissed the appeal brought by the Russian national concerned.

## Restrictive measures in connection with the war against Ukraine

The proceedings concerned measures adopted by the European Union since 2014 in response to actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

These measures were based in particular on Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Regulation (EU) No 269/2014. Subject to certain conditions, both legal instruments provide for the [freezing of funds and economic resources](https://www.mtrlegal.com/russland-sanktionen-blockieren-kontogelder-trotz-insolvenzverfahren/) as well as restrictions on entry into and transit through the territory of the Member States.

### Measures against leading businesspersons and associated persons

Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP covers, among others, leading businesspersons and certain persons, entities and bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. It also covers natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them.

Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, read in conjunction with Article 2 of that Regulation, contains a substantively equivalent provision. The Regulation also provides for the list to be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months.

Subject to certain conditions, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of frozen funds or economic resources. Certain [payments under contracts](https://www.mtrlegal.com/eu-sanktionen-wann-zahlungen-aus-russland-erlaubt-sind/) concluded before the person concerned was included in the list also remain possible in accordance with the relevant provisions.

## Inclusion of the appellant in the sanctions lists

The Council of the European Union included the appellant in the lists relating to Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 by acts adopted on 9 March 2022.

The statement of reasons was based on the fact that she was the chair of the board of trustees of a foundation that administered the charitable activities of large companies. At the same time, she was married to a businessperson who was himself subject to restrictive measures due to his position and activities.

The Council therefore concluded that she was associated with a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors from which the Russian Government derived substantial revenue.

## Proceedings before the General Court of the European Union

On 17 May 2022, the appellant brought an action for annulment of the acts concerning her. She essentially relied on two pleas in law:

- The Council had wrongly concluded that she was associated with her husband within the meaning of the relevant criterion.
- The measures directed against her infringed her fundamental rights and the principle of proportionality.

At the Council’s request, by decision of 10 March 2023, the proceedings were joined with Case T‑270/22, which concerned her husband, solely for the purposes of the oral part of the procedure. The applicant had objected to the joinder.

By [judgment of 6 September 2023 – T‑272/22](https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/redirect/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=DDEDCBA8ACBA04EE1AFC9334229DEDB3?docid=277023&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&occ=first&part=1&cid=4400292), the General Court dismissed the action and ordered the applicant to pay the costs.

### Assessment of the association between the spouses

According to the General Court, the concept of association refers to persons who are, in principle, linked by shared interests. A relationship arising from an economic activity is not necessarily required. However, an association may not be inferred solely from a family relationship.

The General Court found that the applicant did not perform any direct role in her husband’s two companies. According to the assessment at first instance, however, her activities within the foundation established shared interests extending beyond the marriage. The foundation administered charitable activities for the companies with which her husband was associated.

In the General Court’s view, the Council had therefore provided sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence of an association. That assessment was based not only on the marriage but also on the relationships between the foundation and the companies concerned.

### Fundamental rights and proportionality

The General Court also rejected the second plea in law. In its assessment, the restrictions resulting from the restrictive measures met the requirements of Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

The General Court found neither an infringement of the principle of equal treatment nor a breach of the principle of legal certainty. The fact that the concept of association was broadly defined and afforded the Council a degree of discretion did not render it incompatible with those principles.

## Three grounds of appeal before the ECJ

By her appeal, the appellant sought to have the judgment at first instance set aside and the acts concerning her annulled. In the alternative, she requested that the case be referred back to the General Court.

She relied on three grounds of appeal:

- The General Court had wrongly classified her husband as a leading businessperson involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government.
- The General Court had erred in law in applying the concept of an associated person to her relationship with her husband.
- The measures directed against her were disproportionate and infringed her fundamental rights and the principle of legal certainty.

The Council contended that the appeal should be dismissed and that the appellant should be ordered to pay the costs.

## Withdrawal of the first ground of appeal

The proceedings were initially stayed pending judgment in several parallel appeals. Those cases – C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P – were joined and decided by the Grand Chamber on 26 March 2026. The ECJ dismissed the appeals. The judgment is reported as ECLI:EU:C:2026:245.

After the proceedings in Case C‑695/23 P were resumed, the appellant stated that she was withdrawing her first ground of appeal. The ECJ therefore did not have to rule on either that ground of appeal or the Council’s plea of inadmissibility relating to it.

## Concept of association in family relationships

The ECJ found the second ground of appeal to be unfounded. The central issue was the conditions under which family members may be regarded as associated with one another.

### A family relationship alone is not sufficient

According to the Court of Justice, the principle of legal certainty requires clear and precise rules whose application is foreseeable for those subject to them. However, it does not follow that the EU legislature must refrain from using abstract legal concepts or determine in advance every conceivable situation in which they may apply.

In the ECJ’s view, the definition of association used by the General Court was not limited to the existence of a family relationship. In the case of family members, it is instead necessary to establish shared interests that objectively go beyond the relationship itself. The community of interests ordinarily associated with a family is therefore not sufficient.

The ECJ considered the criteria developed by the General Court to be sufficiently clear and precise. Account could be taken of the fact that the associations covered depend on the circumstances of each individual case and that the concept must, in principle, be interpreted broadly.

### No excessive weight given to the marriage

The appellant had argued that the General Court had attached excessive weight to her marriage. The ECJ did not accept that argument.

The General Court had not based its assessment solely on the family relationship. The relationships between the spouses’ respective fields of activity were also decisive. According to the assessment at first instance, the business relationship identified embodied shared interests extending beyond the marriage.

The ECJ also found no contradiction between a business relationship and shared interests. Shared interests may be manifested precisely in such a relationship.

### Activities within different entities

The appellant did not hold a position within the companies with which her husband was associated. Instead, she worked for the foundation, while her husband performed functions within the companies concerned.

The Court of Justice clarified that two natural persons may have shared interests in the form of a business relationship even if they hold positions within different but interconnected entities. Whether this satisfies the criterion of association depends on the specific circumstances.

In the case at hand, the foundation administered charitable activities for companies with which the husband was associated. The General Court was entitled to regard this as a relationship that objectively extended beyond the family relationship.

### Honorary position without control

The appellant further argued that her work for the foundation had merely been performed in an honorary capacity and had not given her any control over its affairs.

The General Court had taken that circumstance into account. In the ECJ’s view, however, the absence of powers of control was not relevant to determining whether an association existed. An association does not require an economic activity or control over the entity concerned.

Accordingly, even an honorary position could indicate shared interests where the foundation administered the charitable activities of companies with which the spouse was associated.

### No distortion of the evidence

The ECJ also rejected the contention that the General Court had distorted the relationships between the foundation and the companies. The General Court had found that the foundation administered the charitable activities of several large companies.

When examining the association, it was entitled to focus on the relationships with the two companies in which the husband was active at the time the contested acts were adopted. According to the Court of Justice, the classification of those relationships as close did not constitute a distortion of the relevant evidence.

### Limits of review in appeal proceedings

The ECJ pointed out that an appeal is limited to points of law. Findings and assessments of fact are, in principle, matters for the General Court. Review by the Court of Justice is possible in this regard, in particular where evidence has been distorted.

A person alleging distortion must precisely identify the facts or evidence concerned and set out the errors alleged. The distortion must also be apparent from the documents in the case file without a fresh and comprehensive assessment of the facts and evidence.

### New arguments inadmissible on appeal

The ECJ regarded the argument that the measures lacked a sufficient connection to the Russian Federation and were inconsistent with the objectives of Article 21 TEU (Treaty on European Union) and Article 215 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) as a new argument.

A party may not raise before the Court of Justice, for the first time, a point that expands the subject matter of the dispute heard by the General Court. Review in appeal proceedings remains limited to the points of law that were already at issue in the proceedings at first instance. The relevant objection was therefore inadmissible.

## Legal certainty and proportionality

The third ground of appeal was also unsuccessful. The ECJ upheld the assessment that the criterion of association neither infringed the principle of legal certainty nor conferred unlimited discretion on the Council.

### Abstract criterion with a limited scope

An abstract and general formulation is not incompatible with the principle of legal certainty for that reason alone. The scope and exercise of the resulting discretion must be defined, or be capable of being defined, with sufficient clarity.

The criterion of association does not operate in isolation. It is linked to a substantive listing criterion, in the present case the criterion concerning leading businesspersons in certain economic sectors. This limits the group of potential addressees.

Although the Council has broad discretion when deciding which persons who satisfy a listing criterion should actually be made subject to restrictive measures, the Court of Justice held that this does not constitute a breach of legal certainty.

The fact that not all persons who may satisfy the requirements are included does not make the selection unlawful either. However, the Council may not adopt measures against persons who do not satisfy the relevant criterion.

### Prevention of circumvention

The Court of Justice placed the criterion of association within the context of the objective of preventing the circumvention of restrictive measures. It is intended to address the risk that a person already included in the list may exert influence over persons associated with them in order to circumvent the effects of the measures directed against them.

According to the judgment, it is not necessary to establish in each individual case that such a risk of circumvention has already materialised in concrete terms. Nor is it necessary for the associated person to have any direct connection with actions by the Russian authorities undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine.

Nor must it be separately demonstrated that the measures directed against the associated person directly exert pressure on the Russian authorities. Their inclusion is based on the objective of ensuring the effectiveness of the measures imposed on the person primarily concerned.

### Assessment of proportionality

According to the ECJ, assessing the proportionality of restrictive measures requires an examination of whether they:

- serve an objective of general interest recognised by the European Union,
- are not manifestly inappropriate in relation to that objective, and
- do not manifestly exceed what is necessary to achieve that objective.

The General Court had examined whether the measures directed against the appellant were appropriate. Since those measures served to prevent circumvention, it was not additionally necessary to establish that they were themselves capable of directly exerting pressure on Russian decision-makers.

### Less onerous measures

The General Court had considered several less onerous measures and found that they would not achieve the objectives pursued with equal effectiveness. It was also entitled to take into account the fact that the appellant had not identified any further alternatives.

The ECJ found that this did not constitute an impermissible shifting of the duty to conduct the assessment. In the absence of corresponding submissions, the General Court was not required either to devise further measures itself or to assume that alternatives not identified were necessarily unsuitable.

### Regular review and exemptions

When assessing the interference with fundamental rights, the General Court was also entitled to take into account the fact that the measures were reviewed regularly. Also relevant were the possibilities, subject to the stipulated conditions, of obtaining authorisation for the release of certain funds or for entry on humanitarian grounds.

On the one hand, those factors were taken into account when examining whether the essence of the rights concerned had been respected. On the other hand, they were included in the proportionality assessment. The ECJ did not find that the General Court had erred in law by attaching excessive weight to them.

Subsequent extensions of the listing and later amendments to the criteria were not the subject of the proceedings at first instance. The objections raised in that regard for the first time in the appeal proceedings were therefore inadmissible.

## Dismissal of the appeal and decision on costs

The ECJ dismissed the second and third grounds of appeal. It was no longer necessary to rule on the withdrawn first ground of appeal. The appeal was therefore unsuccessful in its entirety.

Since the Council had applied for costs, the appellant was ordered to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council.

A further judgment of the General Court of 15 October 2025 – T‑235/25 concerned the subsequent retention of her name on the list and the concept of benefiting from leading businesspersons under Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014. Those separate proceedings were not the subject of the decision in Case C‑695/23 P.

MTR Legal Rechtsanwälte advises companies, investors and high-net-worth individuals on matters of [white-collar criminal law](https://www.mtrlegal.com/rechtsberatung/wirtschaftsstrafrecht/).
